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Abstract
Consider an oligopolistic industry where two firms have access to the same tech-
nology and compete in prices, but one firm has access to better information about
the customers in the market. We assume that better information allows the better
informed firm to attract specific customers. The better informed firm obtains a first
customer contact advantage, whereas the uninformed firm can only offer a menu
of prices without being able to pre-identify the types of customers. We show that
better information does not lead to higher profit.
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1 Introduction
The recent advanced infrastructures in the energy sector based on smart meters are now
capable of real lifetime pricing and remote reading. This has generated a debate in
relation to the potential sensitivity of data on customers’ energy usage that firms will
be able to hold once smart meters are fully installed. Indeed, the major players in the
∗We are particularly indebted to Steffen Hoernig. We also thank Hans Keiding, Philip Doran and the
participants at the Royal Economic Society Conference and at the Research Seminar, Nova SBE. Marta
Rocha acknowledges the financial support of the Fundac¸a˜o para a Cieˆncia e Tecnologia.
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energy markets, such as network providers, suppliers, regulators and customers, recognise
the potential sensitivity of data on customers’ energy usage. The Council of European
Energy Regulators has already made recommendations over potential discriminatory
behaviour and potential measures of data security (CEER 2015).1 Nevertheless, it is
still unclear what impact this new degree of information on competition in the energy
markets is.
The key question posed by this paper is whether a firm with better information about the
customers consumption profile2 in the market than their rivals can use that information
to earn greater profit. Although it might seem intuitive, one cannot make the general
claim that access to better information leads to higher profit.
To study the role of information, we introduce a framework of two firms, which have
access to the same technology and where customers have fixed demand, supplying a
good composed of many commodities that compete in prices. We are interested in the
equilibrium outcomes under no differential information and under differential informa-
tion. To answer our research question, we compare the equilibrium profits of both firms
in two ways. First, we define information advantage as the difference between the equi-
librium profits of the better informed firm and the uninformed firm in the differential
information case. Second, we define information value as the difference between the
equilibrium profits of the better informed firm under differential information and under
no differential information.
We show that, under no differential information, both firms equally share the customers
and types of customers, charge the same payments and obtain zero profits. Under
differential information, we assume that access to better information allows the better
informed firm to attract specific customers. Access to better information gives the
better informed firm a first customer contact advantage. The uninformed firm can only
offer a menu of price vectors without being able to pre-identify the types of customers.
Consequently, access to better information leads to a change in the tie-breaking rule.
1This potential discriminatory behaviour can come from a vertical connection between the distribution
operator (upstream firm) and a retailer firm (downstream firm). This connection can particularly exist
if the downstream firm was previously an integrated part of the upstream firm. Then, if the upstream
firm has access to all customers’ information in the market, there might be incentives for the upstream
firm to give access to better data to its affiliated rather than to the remaining downstream firms in the
market.
2That is, one firm is better informed in the sense that it can see the types of all customers served by
any firm in the industry, whereas the uninformed firm does not have access to this information.
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The same result would hold if, for another reason other than better information, one
firm would have first customer contact advantage. Nonetheless, the uninformed firm can
access the market, preventing the better informed firm from making positive profit. We
find that better information does not give a firm an advantage or disadvantage, that is,
the better informed firm obtains the same equilibrium profit as the uninformed one. We
also show that there is no information value because the better informed firm has the
same equilibrium profit under both cases.
We also analyse whether our results are robust to changes in the number of customers,
number of firms and number of types. We show that as long as it is possible to divide
equally the number of customers between firms, the symmetric Nash equilibria in pure
strategies exist. Under differential information, the exclusionary Nash equilibria exist
despite of the number of customers of each type. However, once we increase the number
of better informed firms, the exclusionary equilibria exist as long as it is possible to
divide equally the number of customers between the better informed firms.
2 Related Literature
This paper relates to two strands of literature. Firstly, it contributes to the literature
on the role of information in oligopolistic markets by analysing the impact of differential
information about the types of customers on equilibrium profits in a one-stage Bertrand
competition. Though this literature under uncertain demand and incomplete informa-
tion is quite broad (see, for example Gal-Or 1987, 1988; Raith 1996; and Vives 1984),
there is relatively little literature on whether access to better information has a positive
impact on the equilibrium profit. Further, there is no general consensus on the result
that emerges. This literature is especially small when competition is via prices. Vives
(1990), using a two-stage model, shows that better informed firms have an incentive to
invest more in the first stage which has the effect of boosting its competitive position
and profitability. In Vives’s framework, better information always increases expected
profit of the better informed firm and it leads to an information advantage. Neverthe-
less, better information may enhance or diminish the rival’s competitive position and
profitability depending whether firms compete a` la Bertrand or a` la Cournot. The conse-
quences of differential information arise because the better informed firm has the option
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to decide to invest more or less in the first stage.
A more related study to the present paper is Einy et al. (2002). It is shown that a
better informed firm is rewarded, under Cournot competition, when firms’ technology
exhibits constant returns to scale. Chokler et al. (2006) challenge the results of Einy
et al. (2002) and prove that in Cournot duopolies with differentiated products and
linear demand and cost functions, the better informed firm earns less profit if both firms
have symmetric demand functions. Consequently, one cannot claim, under generality,
that better information leads to higher equilibrium profit for the better informed firm.
Indeed, we show that in a one-stage Bertrand competition, differential information can
lead to no information advantage or disadvantage.
Secondly, our paper contributes to the price discrimination literature and in particular,
on competitive price discrimination and on personalised pricing, whereby firms charge
different prices to different customers based on their willingness to pay. The literature on
personalised pricing has been expanded due to the increasing ability of firms to collect
customers’ data and the ability to offer dynamic pricing. Some papers such as Choudhary
et al. (2005) and Ghose and Huang (2009) have studied the competitive implications of
personalised pricing in a model with product differentiation. Choudhary et al. (2005)
show, in a model with vertical differentiation, that firms can be worse off when they offer
personalised pricing. Ghose and Huang (2009) show, in a model of spatial differentiation,
that firms are better off when they offer personalised pricing and quality compared to
the case when they do not adopt customised pricing. This is because firms can offer
higher qualities to each customer at higher rent extraction ability for each firm. Ghose
and Huang (2009) assume that when a firm adopts personalised pricing and quality it
can perfectly target customers in both price and quality. In our paper, we also assume
that a firm that is better informed can perfectly target customers. We contribute to this
literature by studying personalised pricing in a model with homogeneous goods and with
differential information. In particular, we show that although it is possible for the better
informed firm to target customers, it does not allow it to charge higher prices.
The literature on privacy is closely related to the literature on competitive price dis-
crimination and on personalised pricing. The literature on economics of privacy has
analysed, for example, how firms use past behaviour of consumers to infer their taste
and price (see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole 2000, and Esteves 2010); and how privacy
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actions are undertaken by consumers and how consumer information is sold to firms (see
e.g. Casadeus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane 2015, Montes et al. 2016, and Taylor and
Wagman 2014). This literature has been expanding significantly due to the rise of new
technologies and online markets that are able to store consumers’ personal information.3
This also relates to the motivation of our paper in the sense that smart meters will
allow for monitoring and recording of electricity consumption on a near real-time basis.
Technology will also allow identifying the activities of consumers by matching data on
their electricity usage with known appliance load signatures.4
3 The Model
Consider an industry where two firms compete in the production of m > 1 different
commodities. There is a given finite set A ⊂ Rm+ of types of customers, where a type is
a vector a ∈ A specifying the demand for each of the m commodities. Assume that each
commodity is homogeneous.
Suppose that there are only two types of customers, A = {au, ap}, where au is the uniform
type and ap is the peak type. There are four customers with two uniform customers,
nu = 2, and two peak customers, np = 2. Let Uu = uu − tu and Up = up − tp denote the
utilities of uniform and peak types, respectively, and where tu and tp are the payments
to the firm. We identify type au customers by the requirement that they consume all
commodities of the good by the same amount (i.e. a1u = a2u = ... = amu), whereas the
type ap customers do not consume the same amount of each commodity.
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Firms, indexed by l = 1, 2, have access to the same technology, given by a cost function
C : Rm+ → R+, where C(y) is the cost of producing the output vector y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈
Rm+ . It is assumed throughout that
3For an overview of the literature on economics of privacy see Acquisti et al. (2016).
4See, for example, Figures 5-1 and 5-2 in NIST (2014) that show how non-intrusive appliance load
monitoring techniques can be used to obtain information about individual consumption patterns.
5Take the following example. Let a1 = (0, 6, 0) means that a customer of type a1 consumes 6 units of
commodity 2 and 0 units of commodities 1 and 3. Similar for a2 = (2, 2, 2). The first type of customer
represents the peak type and the second type of customer represents the uniform type. Our framework
with a good that consists of different commodities also allows us to have an example where we have 24
commodities. Electricity can be seen as a good that is composed of 24 commodities and so, commodities
in this case would represent the hourly electricity demand.
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Assumption 1 C is continuous and strictly quasi-convex, i.e. for each c ∈ R+, the
lower contour set L(c) = {y ∈ Rm+ | C(y) ≤ c} is strictly convex.
Assumption 2 C exhibits constant returns to scale, that is C(λy) = λC(y) for all
y ∈ Rm+ and λ ≥ 0.
The assumption of quasi-convexity implies that if y′ or y′′, with y′ 6= y′′, can be produced
at the same cost, then the production of 12y
′ + 12y
′′ will be less costly. For example,
assume that y′ = (50, 0, 0) and y′′ = (0, 50, 0) can be produced at the same cost, then
supplying 12y
′ + 12y
′′ = (25, 25, 0) is less costly than producing y′ and y′′. In the context
of energy supply, where the different commodities may be interpreted as consumption
in different time intervals, it means that producing a constant flow over time is cheaper
than changing it according to the time of the day.
The assumption of constant returns to scale may seem less convincing, but its role is
mainly to avoid overly simplistic arguments for competition in cases where one firm in
the market has a larger production than the others; under decreasing returns to scale this
would by itself constitute an efficiency loss to society, and we exclude this case by our
assumptions. Nevertheless, our motivation derives from the retail energy market where
it is not conclusive from the literature that retailers’ technology necessarily exhibits
decreasing or increasing returns to scale as opposed to constant returns to scale.
The definition below states that an efficient allocation of production across suppliers is
one that minimises production costs. That is, (y1, y2) being efficient means that a total
output of y = y1 + y2 cannot be produced at a lower cost.
Definition 1 The allocation of production (y1, y2) is efficient if and only if it minimises
C(y′) + C(y′′) over all (y′, y′′) ∈ Rm+ × Rm+ with y′ + y′′ = y1 + y2.
Since C is strictly quasi-convex (meaning that the sets L(c) are strictly convex, so that
a convex combination of two distinct points of L(c) belongs to its interior), it is simple
to see which allocations are cost minimising. That is, y1 = λy and y2 = (1 − λ)y for
λ ∈ [0, 1] and some y ∈ Rm+ . This means that, for a given y, the cost is minimised when
firms produce the same combination of commodities.
Let x, y be two vectors that are not multiples of each other. In particular, this im-
plies C (x) , C (y) > 0. Let δ = C(x)/C (y), i.e. C (x) = C (δy) by constant returns.
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Then,
C (x+ y) = C
(
x+
1
δ
(δy)
)
,
from constant returns to scale:
=
(
1 +
1
δ
)
C
(
δ
δ + 1
x+
1
δ + 1
(δy)
)
,
from C (x) = C (δy), x 6= δy, and strict quasi-convexity (note that we must make use of
the fact that we have a convex combination between x and δy):
<
(
1 +
1
δ
)(
δ
δ + 1
C (x) +
1
δ + 1
C (δy)
)
,
multiply through with
(
1 + 1δ
)
, using constant returns once again:
= C (x) + C (y) .
Hence,
C(x+ y) < C(x) + C(y). (1)
For example, if x = au and y = ap, then C(au + ap) < C(au) + C(ap). That is, the
cost of supplying both types of customers is lower than separately supplying both types.
Another case used in the paper is x = 2au + ap and y = au + 2ap, then C(3au + 3ap) <
C(2au + ap) + C(au + 2ap).
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Let p = (p1, p2) be two price vectors in Rm+ .7 Assume that prices are non-negative.8
Recall that we are working in a context of fixed demand with a finite set of types of
customers and firms compete to satisfy this fixed demand. Firms set simultaneously
their prices, customers observe and buy from the firm that offers the lowest payment.
That is, customers can only buy from one single firm.
6A similar result in Cambini and Martein (2009) shows that homogeneity of degree one combined
with quasi-convexity produces convexity (Theorem 2.2.2).
7Each price is a vector, i.e. we have a price for each commodity, pl = (pl1, . . . , p
l
m), for l = 1, 2. In
the context of electricity, this means that we allow for “dynamic pricing” (i.e. time variant electricity
prices). The application of more dynamic forms of prices has been limited in the domestic and small
business sectors, however advanced metering solutions have made this possible (Haney et al. 2011).
8The reasonability on this assumption is based on the lack of evidence of negative electricity retail
prices. Nevertheless, if this assumption were to be dropped, it would become easier not to violate the
incentive compatibility constraints of the types of customers.
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3.1 No Differential Information
So far, we have only delineated the general features of our model, without going into
informational problems. Consider first the case where no firm has access to better
information. Firm l’s problem is, for l = 1, 2,
max
plu,p
l
p
pil = nlup
l
u · au + nlpplp · ap − C(nluau + nlpap),
where nlu and n
l
p are, respectively, the number of uniform and peak types customers
that firm l supplies. Customers buy the good if their utility of buying the good is non-
negative. That is, for reasonable prices, customers buy the good and choose to buy from
the firm that offers the lowest payment. Firms face the incentive compatibility (IC)
constraints that require customers not to accept a different price vector other than the
one that corresponds to their type.
uu − pu · au ≥ uu − pp · au, (2)
up − pp · ap ≥ up − pu · ap. (3)
These constraints can be re-written as
(pp − pu) · ap ≤ 0 ≤ (pp − pu) · au. (4)
Equation 4 has a geometrical interpretation in the sense that it indicates the space for
non-binding IC constraints.
The IC constraints play an important role in finding potential equilibrium outcomes.
Firms need to construct a menu of price vectors that ensures that the IC constraints are
satisfied for the same total payment. Since demand vectors of both types are different and
fixed, IC constraints can be satisfied by changing pu in the following way: increasing the
price of the commodities that the peak type customer consumes more and decreasing the
price of the commodities that the peak type customer consumes less. This is illustrated
in the example below.
Example 1 Let au = (3, 3, 3) be the demand of the uniform customer and ap = (7, 1, 1)
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be the demand of the peak customer with the following price vectors for each type, pu =
(1, 1, 1) and pp = (2, 1, 1). The uniform customer pays a total payment equal to 9,
whereas the peak customer pays a total payment equal to 16 if it accepts the peak payment
and it pays a total payment equal to 9 if it accepts the uniform type payment. Thus, the
IC constraint for the peak type is no longer satisfied. However, we can find a price
that satisfies this condition. Take the price vector pˆu = (2.2, 0.4, 0.4). This generates
the same total payment for the uniform type. The peak type would need to pay a total
payment equal to 16.2 when accepting the uniform type payment. Thus, it prefers to
accept the peak type payment.9
Both firms simultaneously set their prices, customers observe all posted prices and buy
from the firm with the lowest payment. The lowest payments are
pu · au = min{p1u · au, p2u · au},
pp · ap = min{p1p · ap, p2p · ap}.
If both firms post pu · au and pp · ap, then they equally split the customers (i.e. nlu = 1
and nlp = 1, for l = 1, 2) such that the IC constraints hold. We want to investigate Nash
equilibria in which both firms are active in the market, set the same payments and supply
the same composition of types. The set of such symmetric equilibria is characterised by
two conditions. First, both firms have in equilibrium pil ≥ 0. Second, unilateral price
under-cutting should not be profitable. The next proposition shows existence of Nash
equilibria with symmetric payments. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 There are two classes of Nash equilibria with symmetric payments in
pure strategies with pil = 0, l = 1, 2, and with the following payments:
(i) pu · au = C(2au + ap)− C(au + ap) and pp · ap = 2C(au + ap)− C(2au + ap),
(ii) pu · au = 2C(au + ap)− C(au + 2ap) and pp · ap = C(au + 2ap)− C(au + ap).
Proposition 1 shows that both firms can equally share the customers in terms of types
while offering the same payment to each type. There is a continuum of Nash equilibria
9This can also be achieved by allowing for negative prices in some commodities or by changing both
price vectors. Further, the general case with m commodities makes the problem less restricted. That is,
if the IC constraints are satisfied with three commodities, these will also be satisfied with m commodities
because there are more degrees of freedom for the firm to find different combinations of prices.
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because for the same total payment there can be different prices for each commodity.
Thus, there is symmetry in terms of payments, but there can be asymmetry in terms of
prices. Proposition 2 considers the existence of equilibria with symmetric payments when
firms make zero profits. It is important to consider a) the existence of an equilibrium
with symmetric payments where at least one firm makes positive profit; and b) the
existence of an equilibrium with asymmetric payments.
Proposition 2 There is no Nash equilibrium with asymmetric payments or where at
least one firm makes positive profit.
Proposition 2 shows that there is no Nash equilibrium with asymmetric payments. Fur-
ther, it will not be an equilibrium if one firm gains positive profit and the other makes
zero profit. This is because if firms obtain different profits, then the firm with lower
profit has an incentive to mimic the other firm’s payments.
3.2 Differential Information
Assume that firms have different access to information about customers. Let firm 1 be
better informed in the sense that it can see the types of all customers served by any firm
in the industry, whereas firm 2 does not have access to this information. In connection
with this difference in information, we assume that firm 1 can use the information on
types to offer personalised payments, wa ∈ R, to customers of type a ∈ A, whereas firm 2
can only offer a menu of price vectors, (pu, pp) ⊂ Rm × Rm. We assume the tie-breaking
rule that customers buy from firm 1 in case of indifference.10
Given firm 2’s payments, firm 1 can attract customers of type a, subject to a payment
wa, such that
wa ≤ p2a · aa,with a = u, p. (5)
If the payment offered by firm 1 is higher, then customers will not accept it. Firm 2 takes
wa as given and supplies the remaining customers as long as its profit is non-negative.
10This tie-breaking rule makes sense in our framework because firm 1, the better informed firm, can
approach each customer knowing beforehand its type, whereas firm 2 needs to wait for each customer to
approach the firm.
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Firm 2’s problem is
max
pu,pp
pi2 = n2up
2
u · au + n2pp2p · ap − C(n2uau + n2pap). (6)
Since firm 2 does not have access to the same information about customers as firm 1,
firm 2’s problem is subject to the IC constraints as in the no differential information
case.
We can observe three potential equilibrium outcomes: (1) firm 1 sells only to uniform
customers and firm 2 sells to peak customers, (2) firm 1 sells only to peak customers
and firm 2 sells to uniform customers, and (3) firm 1 sells to both types of customers.
We show that there is no equilibrium where the allocation of customers is as in (1) or
(2), but there is an exclusionary equilibrium where the better informed firm sells to
both types of customers. Further, the case where both firms equally split the customers
cannot be an equilibrium due to the tie-breaking rule. The proposition below states this
result.
Proposition 3 (Exclusionary equilibria) First, there is no equilibrium where firms sup-
ply equally the customers or where each firm supplies a type of customer. Second, there
is a continuum of equilibria, where the better informed firm sells to both types such that:
(i) wu + wp = C(au + ap),
(ii) wu ≤ C(2au + ap)− C(au + ap) and wp ≤ C(au + 2ap)− C(au + ap),
(iii) wu = p
2
u · au and wp = p2p · ap,
with allocation n1u = 2 and n
1
p = 2, thereby achieving profit pi
1 = 0.
Proposition 3 implies that holding better information about the customers in the market
and the ability to contact customers before firm 2, does not translate into higher profit
for firm 1. This is because positive profit would give firm 2 an incentive to undercut
firm 1’s payments.
3.3 Market Structure and Social Surplus
There is one possible market structure with differential information and one possible case
without differential information. In each case, firms earn zero profits, with the difference
that firm 2 is excluded from the market in the differential information case. This arises
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from our assumption of homogeneous commodities.
Proposition 2 shows that, under no differential information, there is no Nash equilibrium
with asymmetric payments. This holds even when one firm in the market supplies both
types of customers. This result is reversed once we introduce differential information. In
fact, Proposition 3 shows that there is a continuum of Nash equilibria when the better
informed firm supplies both types of customers. The tie-breaking rule plays a key role
in this difference. Access to information about the types of customers in the market
provides firm 1 a first customer contact advantage. Firm 2 can only offer a menu of
price vectors without being able to pre-identify the types of customers.
We have defined information advantage as the difference between the equilibrium profits
of the better informed firm and the uninformed firm in the differential information case.
In this case, firm 2 is excluded while firm 1 supplies all customers. There is no information
advantage because firm 2 is excluded from the market.
We have defined information value as the difference between the equilibrium profits of
the better informed firm in the differential information case and in the no differential
information. There is no information value because the better informed firm has the
same equilibrium profit in both cases.
These results contrast with the literature that from our knowledge says that there is
an information advantage or disadvantage depending on the firms’ information setup
(Chokler et al. 2006). This result is explained by two main reasons. First, the presence
of competition because the residual customer can switch to the other firm, it is not
possible for the better informed firm to extract surplus from the customers through its
access to information about the customers. Second, firm 2 is allowed to offer a menu
of two price vectors (i.e. one for each type). The price vectors allow firm 2 to avoid
giving an information rent that induces the customers to reveal their private information
regarding their types. If, instead of offering a menu of price vectors, firm 2 could only
offer one price vector to all customers, then firm 1 would be able to charge higher prices
and enjoy an information advantage.
This conclusion holds in the short-run where the uninformed firm imposes a competitive
constraint to the better informed firm and therefore, the better informed firm gains
zero profit despite holding better information about all customers in the market. In
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the medium-run, the uninformed firm will not enter the market, or leave quickly, which
creates the possibility of the informed firm being able to charge higher prices and enjoy
an information advantage.
In each of the market structures mentioned above, social surplus equals the utility of
customers less the operating cost. The social surplus is the same in all cases because
there is no difference in terms of costs and the fixed demand is fully covered. The
customer surplus will also be the same in both market structures. However, the surplus
of each type may differ; in fact, each type may be better, worse or remain the same
when we compare both market structures. The reason being is that there are two
classes of Nash equilibria for each market structure. For example, if under no differential
information the set of equilibrium payments is pu · au = C(2au + ap)− C(au + ap) and
pp · ap = 2C(au + ap) − C(2au + ap), whereas in the differential information case the
set of equilibrium payments is pu · au = 2C(au + ap) − C(au + 2ap) and pp · ap =
C(au + 2ap)− C(au + ap). Then, the uniform type will be better off and the peak type
will be worse off when firm 1 is better informed. Nevertheless, the customer surplus
remains the same.
Based on definition 1, the allocation of production is efficient in both market structures.
This is because a combination of different types is supplied by a given firm.
4 Robustness Analysis
To this point, we have assumed that there are two firms and two types of customers.
We are now interested in examining the robustness of the results to small changes in the
number of customers, firms and types.
4.1 Number of customers
So far, we have assumed that there are a total of four customers, two of each type.
Suppose now that there are nu uniform customers and np peak customers, with nu, np ∈
Z+ and finite numbers. Suppose that no firm has access to better information.
If for at least one type na2 /∈ Z+, a ∈ A, then it is no longer possible to split each type
of customers equally between firms. Consequently, production is not efficient. By (1),
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combining all customers in one single firm leads to cost savings and so, higher profit. The
same applies for a situation with asymmetric payments. Hence, the result of Proposition
1 will not hold if it is not possible to share equally each type of customers between both
firms.
Furthermore, under differential information the same result holds. That is, the better
informed firm has incentives to supply both types of customers, independently of the
number of customers of each type. Thus, the result of no information advantage and no
information disadvantage holds if it is possible to split equally the customers between
firms.
4.2 Number of firms
We are now interested in analysing the impact on the market outcomes once we add one
more firm. Assume that there are three firms and consider three customers of each type
instead of two in order to avoid the unequal split. As shown above, if it is not possible to
split equally the customers between firms, then Nash equilibria with symmetric payments
in pure strategies under no differential information no longer exist.
If we add one more uninformed firm, then this firm will behave as firm 2 above because
it is not a profitable deviation to decrease (or increase) the payment for the peak type
or uniform type. The payments will remain the same and the same Nash equilibria with
symmetric payments exist.
Assume now that firm 1 and firm 3 are equally informed, whereas firm 2 remains unin-
formed. Since firms 1 and 3 cannot equally split the customers of each type, then the
exclusionary outcome under differential information will no longer hold. As before, the
result of no information advantage and no information disadvantage holds if it is possible
to split equally the customers between firms.
4.3 Number of types
The number of types increases the complexity in setting a menu of price vectors. Consider
three types, au, ar, and ap. In order to avoid the unequal split, assume that there are
two customers of each type. Now, we have the following additional IC constraints to
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those already mentioned before: pu · au ≤ pr · au, pp · ap ≤ pr · ap, pr · ar ≤ pu · ar and
pr · ar ≤ pp · ar. Example 2 shows that if there are not enough degrees of freedom to find
different combinations of prices (i.e. three types and three commodities), then it is not
possible to adjust the payments such that the IC constraints are satisfied.
Example 2 Consider the following consumption profiles of three different types of cus-
tomers: au = (3, 3, 3), ar = (3, 3.5, 2.5) and ap = (7, 1, 1). Consider the following price
vectors for each type, pu = (1, 1, 1), pr = (1, 1.5, 1) and pp = (2, 1, 1). In this case, both
types ar and ap would prefer to accept the payment offered to the uniform type because
they would pay less. Even by considering changes in all price vectors, in order to main-
tain the same total payment, no solution exists with non-negative prices. Thus, the IC
constraints would not be satisfied.
If the IC constraints are not satisfied, the result stated in Proposition 1 would no longer
hold as one firm can offer a higher price and enjoy profits. However, this problem can be
solved by adding enough commodities. The example below shows that the IC constraints
are satisfied once we add two more commodities. Note that, as before, we imposed a non-
negativity constraint in the price vectors. Without such constraint it would be possible
to solve the problem in Example 2 without the violation of the IC constraints.
Example 3 Consider the following consumption profiles of three different types of cus-
tomers: au = (2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5), ar = (3, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2) and ap = (7, 1, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5).
Consider the following price vectors for each type: pu = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1), pr = (1.5, 1, 1, 1, 1)
and pp = (1.5, 1, 1, 1, 1). As before, types ar and ap would prefer to accept the payment
offered to the uniform type because they would pay less. If we change the price vectors
as follows: pu = (3, 2, 0, 0, 0), pr = (1.8, 3.4, 0, 0, 0) and pp = (1.8, 3.4, 0, 0, 0), then the
same total payments remain the same and the IC constraints are satisfied.
In order to find different combinations of prices that ensure the IC constraints to hold,
we need to have a large number of commodities that is greater than the number of
types. Under that case, the result of no information advantage or disadvantage is robust
to changes in the number of types.
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5 Conclusion
We have analysed whether there is an information advantage or disadvantage in a market
where firms compete in prices with a good composed by homogeneous commodities. We
have assumed that if one of the firms knows the corresponding type of all customers in
the market, then this firm can offer personalised payments. Even though it is possible
for the better informed firm to select its own customers as opposed to the uninformed
firm, it obtains the same equilibrium profit as the uninformed firm and as in the case
with no differential information.
While the literature does not generally conclude that better information entails higher
profit, to the best of our knowledge it exclusively shows cases where there is information
advantage or disadvantage. Indeed, this paper presents a game where the equilibrium
profits for both firms (better informed and uninformed) remain the same.
Furthermore, we show that it is not the additional ability to price discriminate that allows
the better informed firm to be able to exclude the uninformed firm from the market; but
rather the first customer contact advantage. The uninformed firm can only offer a menu
of price vectors without being able to pre-identify the type of customers.
Future research could be to consider the impact on the results of some type of demand-
side management where customers could shift their own demand for electricity during
peak periods in order to reduce their energy consumption overall. Another potential
extension would be to consider differentiated goods. Electricity can be sold as a differ-
entiated good if, for example, we consider reliability, which may be crucial in case there
is a positive probability of power blackouts. In this case, each contract offered to a given
customer would specify the price and the customer’s service order or priority.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Let prices be as in (i) stated in Proposition 1, then pil = 0, l = 1, 2, with corresponding
allocation of customers nlu = 1 and n
l
p = 1. Further, we can assume that prices are in the
interior of the feasible set given by the IC constraints and that small unilateral changes
on prices do not violate these constraints. This means that the following conditions need
to hold:
pu · au ≤ pp · au,
pp · ap ≤ pu · ap,
and pu · au + pp · ap = C(au + ap).
Given that au and ap are not multiples of each other, firms can adjust the payments such
that the IC constraints are satisfied. That is, pu can be adjusted such that pu ·au changes,
but pu · ap remains constant. Thus, we can move any price vector from the boundary
into the interior of the feasible set. Hence, payments set in (i) can be implemented
while IC constraints are satisfied. The same applies for the payments set in (ii) stated
in Proposition 1.
Even with IC constraints being satisfied, there are several ways in which a firm could
deviate.
(a) If one firm increases the price of the uniform type, then it loses the uniform customer
and obtains
pˆi = pp · ap − C(ap)
= 2C(au + ap)− C(2au + ap)− C(ap) < 0,
where the inequality in the second line comes from (1). Thus, increasing the price of
the uniform type is not a profitable deviation. Similarly, if one firm increases the price
of the uniform customer and decreases the price of the peak type customer, then it
loses the uniform type and attracts one more peak type at pˆp · ap < pp · ap. Then,
pˆi = 2(pˆp · ap) − C(2ap) = 2(pˆp · ap − C(ap)), where the second equality comes from
constant returns to scale. However, pˆi = 2(pˆp ·ap−C(ap)) < 0 because pˆp ·ap < pp ·ap =
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2C(au + ap)− C(2au + ap) < C(ap).
(b) By the same reasoning, if firm one decreases the price of the uniform customer and
increases the payment of the peak type customer, then it loses the peak type customer
and attracts one more uniform type customer at pˆu · au < pu · au. By (1), pu · au =
C(2au + ap)− C(au + ap) < C(au), then pˆi < pi = 0. By the same reasoning, increasing
the price of the peak type is not a unilateral profitable deviation.
(c) If one firm slightly decreases the price of the uniform type (i.e. pˆu · au < pu · au),
then it supplies both uniform customers and one peak customer and it obtains pˆi =
2(pˆu · au) + pp · ap − C(2au + ap) < 2pu · au + pp · ap − C(2au + ap) = 0. Therefore,
decreasing the price of one of the commodities of the uniform type is not a profitable
deviation.
(d) If one firm slightly decreases the price of the peak type (i.e. pˆp·ap < pp·ap), it supplies
one uniform type and two peak type, obtaining pˆi = pu · au + 2(pˆp · ap)−C(au + 2ap) <
pu · au + 2pp · ap −C(au + 2ap) = 3C(au + ap)−C(2au + ap)−C(au + 2ap) < 0, by (1).
Hence, decreasing the price of the peak type is not a profitable deviation.
(e) If one firm increases the price of both peak and uniform types, then loses all customers
and therefore, it is not a profitable deviation.
(f) If one firm decreases the price of both peak and uniform types, such that pˆp·ap < pp·ap
and pˆu · au < pu · au, then revenue falls below total cost of supplying peak and uniform
type customers, i.e. pˆi < pi = 0.
We conclude that it is not profitable for a firm to unilaterally deviate. Similarly, it is
not profitable for a firm to unilaterally deviate if pu · au = 2C(au + ap) − C(au + 2ap)
and pp · ap = C(au + 2ap)− C(au + ap).
Proof of Proposition 2:
As shown in the proof of proposition 1, we can assume that unilateral small changes
in prices do not violate IC constraints. There are different cases that need to be anal-
ysed.
Case 1. Assume that pi1 = 0 and pi2 > 0. Then, firm 1 has an incentive to mimic firm
2’s payments and increase profit. The same reasoning applies to the reverse case.
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Case 2. Let payments be symmetric such that pil > 0, l = 1, 2. As shown in case 1,
profits of both firms need to be equal. It is a profitable deviation to slightly decrease both
payments, pˆu ·au < pu ·au and pˆp ·ap < pp ·ap, such that IC constraints still hold. Then,
the deviating firm gains pˆi = 2pˆu·au+2pˆp·ap−C(2au+2ap) = 2(pˆu·au+pˆp·ap−C(au+ap))
(by constant returns to scale). Given that demand is fixed and unilateral changes are
very small, we can say w.l.o.g. that pu · au ≈ pˆu · au and pp · ap ≈ pˆp · ap. Then,
pˆi ≈ 2(pu · au + pp · ap − C(au + ap)) = 2pi > pi > 0.
Case 3. Let payments be asymmetric such that pil = 0, l = 1, 2. Again, we can assume
that unilateral small changes in prices do not violate IC constraints. There are several
cases that need to be analysed. In all these cases, one firm will offer a lower payment
than the other firm for at least one type. Then, that firm has an incentive to slightly
increase the payment without matching the other firm’s offer and hence, without losing
customers.
Case 4. Let payments be asymmetric such that pil > 0, l = 1, 2.
(i) Suppose that p1u · au = p2u · au and p1p · ap < p2p · ap (the same applies if p1u · au = p2u · au
and p2p · ap < p1p · ap). Then, pi1 = pi2 because otherwise any firm could deviate to the
same allocation of types and charge the same payment as the other firm and increase
profit. We can then use pi1 = pi2 to obtain p1p · ap = 12C(au + 2ap) − 12C(au). If firm
2 decreases the price of the peak type such that it attracts one peak type customer, it
obtains pˆi2 = pu · au + pp · ap−C(au + ap). By 12C(au) > C(au + ap)−C(12au + ap) (that
follows from (1)), we know that pˆi2 > pi2. Thus, decreasing the price of the peak type is
a unilateral profitable deviation.
(ii) By the same reasoning, there is a profitable deviation if p1u ·au < p2u ·au and p1p ·ap =
p2p · ap with pil > 0 (the same applies if p2u · au < p1u · au and p1p · ap = p2p · ap).
(iii) Suppose that p1u · au < p2u · au and p1p · ap > p2p · ap. If firm 1 matches the same peak
payment as firm 1, it obtains pˆi1 = 2pu · au + pp · ap−C(2au + ap) > pi1 + 12pi2 = 0.
(iv) Suppose that p1u · au < p2u · au and p1p · ap < p2p · ap. Then, firm 2 is not supplying
any customers and therefore, firm 2 can match exactly the same as firm 1 and supply
equally uniform and peak type customers as firm 1.
We conclude that there is no equilibrium with asymmetric payments and pil > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3:
In order to analyse the potential outcomes of introducing differential information, we
need to consider an equilibrium where firm 1 sells to both uniform customers and firm
2 sells to peak customers (case 1), or firm 1 sells to peak customers and firm 2 sells to
uniform customers (case 2), and an exclusionary equilibrium where firm 1 sells to all
customers (case 3). The case where both firms supply equally the customers is ruled out
because of the tie-breaking rule.
Case 1. Consider the requirements for a situation in which firm 1 sells to type au
customers and firm 2 sells to type ap customers. Both customers and firms must be
satisfied with this split. For customers, this requires that type au prefers to buy from
firm 1,
wu ≤ p2u · au, (7)
and that type ap prefers firm 2,
wp > p
2
p · ap. (8)
Then, firm 2 has an incentive to slightly increase p2p · ap and increase profit. Therefore,
this cannot be an equilibrium.
Case 2. By the same token, there is no equilibrium if firm 1 sells only to ap customers
and firm 2 sells only to au customers.
Case 3. Now, we consider the requirements for a situation in which firm 1 sells to
both types au and ap customers. That is, firm 1 excludes firm 2 serving both customer
types at payments that do not allow firm 2 to cover the cost of attracting any type of
customers. For this to be an equilibrium, it is necessary that firm 1’s profit is non-
negative and the payments of both firms are identical. The latter condition is needed
because otherwise firm 1 could increase the payments up to firm 2’s offers without
losing the customers and gain profit under the assumption that IC constraints hold.
Furthermore, firm 1’s profit must be zero, otherwise firm 2 could undercut and increase
profit, i.e. wu + wp = C(au + ap).
For firm 1, this requires that supplying both types of customers at wu and wp is more
profitable than selling only to type au. Further, firm 1 must prefer supplying all cus-
tomers rather than competing only for the peak type customers or leaving one peak
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customer to firm 2 or to compete for both peak type customers and leaving one uniform
type for firm 2.
2wu + 2wp − C(2au + 2ap) ≥ 2wu − C(2au), (9)
2wu + 2wp − C(2au + 2ap) ≥ 2wp − C(2ap), (10)
2wu + 2wp − C(2au + 2ap) ≥ 2wu + wp − C(2au + ap), (11)
2wu + 2wp − C(2au + 2ap) ≥ wu + 2wp − C(au + 2ap). (12)
Simplifying equations (9) -(10) and using wu+wp = C(au+ap), we obtain the following
conditions:
wa ≤ C(aa), for a = u, p, (13)
wu ≤ C(2au + ap)− C(au + ap), (14)
wp ≤ C(au + 2ap)− C(au + ap). (15)
Further, (14) and (15) are stricter than (13) by strict quasi-convexity.
We suffice to show that wu+wp = C(au+ap), (14) and (15) is non-empty. By summing
equations (14) and (15), we obtain C(3au + 3ap) ≤ C(2au + ap) + C(au + 2ap). By (1)
we know that the resulting condition is strictly satisfied.
There will be different combinations of (wu, wp) that satisfy these conditions and there-
fore, we can have a continuum of equilibria.
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